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ABSTRACT
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of R&D subsidies to firms has produced
mixed results so far. One possible explanation is that firms and project selection
rules may be quite heterogeneous both across agencies and across industries,
leading to different outcomes in terms of the induced additional private effort.
Here we focus on the participation stage. Using a sample of Spanish firms, we test
for differences across agencies and industries. Our results suggest that firms in the
same industry face different hurdles to participate in different agencies’ programs,
that participation patterns may reflect a combination of agency goals, and that
patterns differ across high-tech and low-tech industries.
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21. Introduction.∗
Substantial empirical evidence backs the claim that social returns to R&D activities are
greater than private returns, giving support to the well-known hypothesis that the market
allocation of resources to innovation can be sub-optimal.1 Identification and
measurement of the specific sources of market failures, analysis and design of proper
policies to address them, and empirical evaluation of the effects that these policies have
in practice are important issues on the research agenda.
An extensive literature identifies several factors that condition a firm’s decisions, such
as limited appropriability of returns to R&D activities, market competition regime and
financial constraints derived from imperfect capital markets. Theoretical models of
R&D policy have been developed as well, showing that R&D subsidies could restore
incentives to reach the efficient allocation when knowledge spillovers are the main
reason for under-investment. Implementation of a subsidy based R&D policy, however,
may be difficult in practice given the information requirements.2 In particular, the public
agency must be able to identify those R&D projects where the gap between private and
social returns is high, and which would not be carried out without some type of subsidy.
                                                          
∗We are grateful to the Fundación Empresa Pública for kindly providing the data, and to the Ministry of
Education of Spain and Generalitat de Catalunya for funding this research through projects BEC2003-
01831, SEC2002-01612 and SGR2001-160 respectively. We have received very useful comments from
two anonymous referees as well as from Jordi Jaumandreu, José M. Labeaga, Lourdes Moreno, and
participants in the 29th EARIE conference. All errors are our own responsibility.
1 Zvi Griliches has been a key contributor to this literature. See Griliches (1992, 1995) for overviews on
R&D and productivity, and a discussion on measurement problems, and Jones and Williams (1998) on
measuring the social returns to R&D.
2 See Socorro (2003) and references therein.
3In addition, each subsidy should be project specific, since the source and magnitude of
underinvestment is likely to differ across firms and projects.3 A first question to
investigate is how subsidies are allocated among firms and projects in practice in order
to identify patterns, and analyze whether the resulting allocation outcomes are
consistent with particular agency goals.
Furthermore, we observe that a variety of public agencies are involved in allocating
R&D subsidies. Within European Union countries, national, regional and EU-level
R&D subsidy programs are in place. In the US there are federal and state R&D
programs as well. We could ask whether all agencies use similar rules in awarding
subsidies. For example, in the hypothetical case that the purpose of all agencies was to
address market failures, and if there were no explicit ex ante differences in eligibility
requirements or in application costs, a firm presenting a proposal for an R&D project
should have the same probability of obtaining a subsidy from any agency.4 Evidence of
the contrary would mean that agencies might target or reach in fact different types of
firms or projects.
Existing empirical research has addressed the effects that R&D subsidies have on a
firm’s R&D effort, growth or patenting activity, although results are not conclusive. To
                                                          
3 Other commonly used policy tools do not involve the choice of projects by the public agency. R&D tax
credits reduce the cost of R&D to all firms, independently of the type of R&D project they undertake. For
a review on R&D tax credits, see Hall and Van Reenen (2000).
4 Programs at the European Union level do have a specific requirement: eligible proposals must involve
cooperation among firms and/or institutions from several EU countries. However, international or
national cooperation is not required in many national or regional government programs, although it may
be encouraged.
4the best of our knowledge, there has been very little research on the subsidy allocation
process, variation across agencies or industries, and its implications for subsidy
effectiveness. Our aim is to take a small, rather exploratory step in that direction, testing
some hypotheses about factors that affect a firm’s participation status in different R&D
subsidy programs, and testing for inter-agency and inter-industry differences. We use
data from a firm level survey in Spain to explore how program participation is related to
some observed firm characteristics, and how industry and firm characteristics interact in
explaining participation in different R&D programs.
Our results show that having previous experience in R&D affects participation status in
almost all industries and for both national and regional level programs, suggesting that
during the period studied R&D programs had only very limited success at reaching
firms that were not already doing R&D. We observe that firm characteristics such as
firm size have different weights across agencies and industries, implying that these
programs reach in practice different populations of firms. This outcome hints that
agencies might either have different goals or face different difficulties in reaching the
desired population of firms. Data limitations, however, prevent us from distinguishing
between these two hypotheses. The main implication is that when attempting to estimate
the additionality effects of public funding, differences across agencies and industries
should be expected, partly because of allocation heterogeneity.
In section 2 we briefly summarize some issues raised in current research on R&D
subsidy programs. In section 3 we present the most relevant features of our data. In
section 4 we discuss the empirical framework, and section 5 describes estimation
results. Finally, we draw some conclusions and implications for further research.
52. Some previous evidence.
Systematic evaluation of the performance of government policies is becoming
increasingly important both on economic and political grounds. In some policy areas,
such as training programs, evaluation research has been developing for quite some
time.5 Extension to innovation policies is more recent, but expanding. Most empirical
research on R&D subsidies to firms has focused on the effects they have on privately
funded R&D or on performance indicators. Klette, Moen and Griliches (2000) and
David, Hall and Toole (2000) provide thorough reviews of econometric studies
addressing this issue.6 Both surveys discuss methodological aspects that may account to
some extent for the absence of clear and unambiguous results, and conclude with two
recommendations. First, that empirical methods that control for selection and
endogeneity bias in the samples, arising from the fact that participation in an R&D
program is not random, should be used. And second, that structural models of both
public agency and firm decisions should be developed in order to improve our
understanding of R&D subsidy effects.7
By focusing on how R&D program participation is determined we hope to make a step
in that direction. Studying the determinants of participation can shed light on the
existence of unexpected barriers to a firm’s participation and on the agencies' explicit or
implicit screening rules. Programs may fail to reach their goals if many potentially
                                                          
5 See Ashenfelter (1978), and Heckman and Vytlacil (2001).
6Some examples of work appearing just after these surveys were submitted are Lerner (1999), Wallsten
(2000) and Lach (2002).
7 The need for developing a good understanding of the microeconomics of firm behavior in order to
interpret correctly observed impacts was also pointed out by Feller, Glasmeier and Mark (1996).
6eligible firms do not to apply. Subsidies might be allocated with different criteria in
different industries by different agencies, leading to differences in effects. Identification
of agencies’ ex post selection rule is important to detect unintended effects and correctly
interpret observed differences in outcomes. In addition, current statistical methods used
in program evaluation, such as matching methods and selection models, rely on having
a good estimate of the probability of program participation.8 Focusing on the
participation stage is therefore an important part of a broader policy evaluation exercise.
With the exception of a report by Feldman and Kelley (2001) on winners of awards
from the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) in the US, we have not found empirical
work where the main focus is explaining participation status at the firm level as the
outcome of agency allocation criteria. Two studies discussed below use semi-aggregate
data as observation unit. Feldman and Kelley had access to information from a specific
survey of 1998 ATP applicants, including the ratings reviewers gave to the projects.
They find that indicators of spillover potential such as the number of business and
university linkages significantly affected the probability of winning an award, jointly
with reviewers’ ratings. In most cases, and in ours in particular, this type of information
is not available to the researcher, who tries to infer public agencies’ implicit selection
rules from the relationship between observed variables and outcomes.
Two empirical papers have previously focused on how public funds are allocated to
different types of R&D projects or to industries, from an aggregate or semi-aggregate
perspective. Lichtenberg (1999) studies the allocation of public grants for biomedical
R&D, and asks whether decisions are consistent with an allocation rule based on disease
                                                          
8 See, for example, recent work by Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) and Duguet (2004).
7characteristics. The unit of observation in this case is the disease, not the research
group. He estimates the size and number of research grants awarded by the NIH as a
function of disease burden, prevalence and incidence, and finds all three factors to be
significant. Svensson (1998) uses a sample of 13 OECD countries and 24 industries to
investigate the weight of political relative to economic factors in explaining the relative
magnitude of R&D subsidies received by each industry. He finds that both types of
variables affect an industry’s share of R&D subsidies.9
We use firm-level data to study the effects that some variables have on the outcome of
firms’ and agencies’ decisions, and test for possible differences in patterns of firm
participation across agencies. Our data include participants and non participants in R&D
subsidy programs. An important limitation we face is that we do not know which firms
applied but did not obtain public funding, or what were the characteristics of the R&D
projects presented by firms. Consequently, we will not be able to unambiguously
identify the agencies’ screening rule, but we still will be able to make some inferences
based on the estimation of program participation equations.
3. A brief overview of the data.
                                                          
9 In a similar spirit, two studies attempt to make inferences about agency rules relative to the allocation of
patent rights. Van Dijk and Duysters (1998) estimate a firm's success at being granted patents from the
European Patent Office as a function of firm characteristics. Their sample consists of patent applicants in
the data processing industry. Cockburn, Kortum and Stern (2002) focus on the patent examination process
at the USPTO; in particular on the role that some patent examiners' characteristics may have on patent
litigation outcomes.
8Our data consists of a large sample of manufacturing firms, some of which have
obtained public funding to finance their R&D activities. The source is a firm-level
survey10 sponsored by the Ministry of Industry in Spain and conducted yearly since
1990. The sample is designed so as to include all firms with more than 200 employees,
and a stratified random sample of those with less than 200 employees and more than
10.11 More than 2000 manufacturing firms are surveyed each year. The survey covers a
wide range of questions. In particular, firms were asked whether they had obtained
public funding for R&D activities, from which funding institutions and the amount of
funding received from each source.
In Tables 1 and 2 we highlight the most relevant features concerning R&D and R&D
subsidies for firms in the sample over the period 1990-1996. Table 1 shows that about
one third of manufacturing firms carried out formal R&D activities, and that this share
was quite stable over the sample period. It also shows the extent of R&D program
participation. Of those firms doing R&D about one fourth received some form of
subsidy, which on average represented 14 to 24 % of R&D spending by each firm. Each
year more than 150 firms in the sample were receiving some subsidy. Overall, 463
different firms received public funding for some time during the sample period, in most
cases (43 %) for one year, 21 % for two years, and the remaining for three or more
years.
[ Insert Table 1 about here]
                                                          
10 The survey, “Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales” is conducted by the Fundación Empresa
Pública. See http://www.funep.es/  for further information.
11 A detailed description of the survey and the sample is provided in Fariñas and Jaumandreu (1999).
9There are three sources of public funds for firms' R&D activities in Spain: the central or
national administration, regional administrations, and other institutions12. Some central
administration programs have been in place for more than 20 years, while most regional
administrations’ programs were set up during the nineties. Both administrations use a
variety of tools to encourage innovation, ranging from the provision of infrastructures to
direct support of individual firms’ R&D. Eligibility rules are not very restrictive: all
agencies emphasize that reaching small and medium sized firms is an important policy
goal, but there are many programs that are addressed to all firms in most fields.13 The
main observable difference between these two administrations is that, from 1990 to
1996, the volume of funds obtained by firms in the sample from the central
administration is much larger than the volume of regional funds.
Table 2 shows that most firms in the sample (at least 70 %) received funding from only
one source. The distribution of private R&D expenditure and of subsidies across
industries is highly correlated. In 1996, firms in four industries (chemicals, electrical
and electronic goods, vehicles and other transportation) accounted for over 80 % of all
R&D in manufacturing. Public funding of firms in the sample was even more
concentrated that year, mostly benefiting Motor Vehicles and Other transportation
equipment.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
                                                          
12 Other institutions includes European Union funds and non-profit private foundations.
13 Innovation and Science policy in Spain became increasingly significant from the mid eighties, when a
National Plan for Scientific policy and Technological Development was implemented. Within the
National Plan there are different types of programs (by field, some focusing on research, others on
development). We do not have information on which type of program firms in our sample obtained funds
from.
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4. Participation in R&D programs: hypotheses, variables and empirical setting.
Since program participation status is the outcome both of the application decision made
by a firm and of the approval or rejection decision made by the public agency, we need
to discuss some hypotheses about the relationship between firm characteristics and each
agent’s decisions as well as the final outcome.
4.1. Explaining firm's decisions: who will apply?
When facing the decision of whether or not to carry out an R&D project, a firm is likely
to compare the expected present value of private profits associated with the project to
the expected present value of profits if it does not do it and just runs its standard
production operations. Public funding, whether it consists of a grant or of a subsidized
loan, reduces the costs of doing R&D. Assuming that a firm is aware of the existence of
these programs, its decision to do R&D will take into account the likelihood of
obtaining public funding. If costs of applying are small enough, and eligibility rules are
not too restrictive, in principle we may assume that all firms that would find R&D
profitable even without any subsidy will be willing to apply for one. In addition, a
subsidy could make R&D activities profitable for some firms that otherwise would not
do any R&D, and they will apply too. Finally, for some firms the expected subsidy
might be to low to make R&D privately profitable, so they will not apply. Hence on the
firm side we have to postulate some hypotheses about variables that may affect private
returns of R&D projects. To do this we turn to previous studies and focus on a limited
number of factors that have been found relevant on empirical or theoretical grounds.
11
Human capital.
We assume that the ability to envision, design and implement an R&D project strongly
depends on the level of formal and informal skills of the firm’s employees and
managers, the stock of human capital. These skills affect the ability to both generate
ideas and take advantage of and use the existing common pool of technological or
scientific knowledge. This is known in the literature as absorptive capacity (Cohen and
Levinthal (1989); Cockburn and Henderson (1998)). We will consider a simple measure
of human capital in our empirical work: the number (or the percentage) of employees in
the firm that have an engineering or college degree.14 We expect a positive association
between human capital and both the profitability of R&D and the probability of
applying for a subsidy because the higher the level of human capital, the greater the
ability to produce ideas for new projects.
Path dependency.
Previous experience in doing R&D contributes to the stock of knowledge embodied in
human capital. Firms that have experience in R&D may be more likely to keep doing
R&D and to apply for funding. Previous experience makes it easier for them to expand
their portfolio of R&D projects without incurring high set up costs.
Technological opportunity.
The shape and parameters of innovation production functions are likely to be quite
different across industries. Technological opportunity, defined in the literature as
advances in scientific and technological understanding originating in own or other
industries (Klevorick et al. (1995)), might be constant across firms within a given
                                                          
14 CEO characteristics, such as age and type of education and experience may also be relevant, as found
in Barker and Mueller(2002). Unfortunately, we do not have data on these issues.
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industry, but is likely to differ across industries, as many empirical studies have
documented (Cohen (1995)). Lim (2003) provides evidence on differences in the
innovation and research processes in the semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries,
where in the latter innovation is more closely related to basic research than in the
former.15 These differences may translate into different parameters for economies of
scale and scope, as well in different set-up costs of R&D across industries. A frequent
way of dealing with this heterogeneity empirically has been the inclusion of industry
dummies in empirical specifications of R&D models. We will instead perform separate
estimations by industry, as this allows for interaction effects between opportunity and
other relevant variables for R&D decisions such as firm size or financing constraints.
Firm Size.
Two arguments can be made to predict a positive relationship between firm size and the
likelihood of doing R&D. First, the development of innovations may involve fixed set-
up costs, part of which may be sunk. This will determine a minimum volume of
revenues or sales for profitability to be positive. Firm size helps overcome the fixed cost
barrier, and hence becomes an important factor in explaining the probability of doing
R&D. In some industries fixed costs will be lower than in others.16
                                                          
15 Qualitative information from R&D managers gives additional support to that view. In an international
workshop on business R&D strategies, managers of firms in the information and communication field
described the research process as consisting more in combining available technologies than in basic
research. In the pharmaceutical industry, managers characterized innovation in their field for its long
product development time (10 years) and for the high cost of producing a new chemical entity (OECD
2001a).
16 González and Jaumandreu (1998) estimate, using basically the same data set used here, that minimum
R&D intensities under which firms tend not to invest in R&D are high in industries such as chemical
13
In addition, expected revenues generated by the new process or product will be a
function of the price and the size of demand for the product. These depend on
appropriability conditions, which in turn are affected by the strength of property rights,
availability of alternative means of appropriation, and extent of market power. The
interaction between appropriability conditions and competition effects is complex,17 and
we do not have firm level indicators for these factors. However, the extent of
appropriability may be correlated with firm size, once other possible correlates are taken
into account (Cohen and Klepper (1996)). We can again expect inter-industry variation:
in those industries where the patent system is an efficient protection mechanism, such as
in pharmaceuticals,18 firm size might be less constraining for doing R&D than in other
industries, everything else constant.
Financing constraints.
The effective cost of doing R&D may vary across firms as a result of differences in the
availability and cost of financing resources. The well known argument is that R&D
investment usually involves higher risk than investment in tangible physical assets, and
that asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders has particularly severe
                                                                                                                                                                         
products, vehicles and leather industries, and relatively low in the food and beverage industries,
suggesting higher set up costs in the former.
17 Some models predict an inverted U relationship between R&D intensity and competition; empirical
studies do find evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
18 Cohen et al. (2000) report that in the US, firms in the Pharmaceutical and Medical Equipment
industries find patents to be a relatively effective mechanism for appropriability, although secrecy and
lead time were declared to be equally effective. In contrast, firms in the Communications equipment
industry considered lead-time to be the most effective mechanism, while patents less than half as much.
14
effects in this case. Imperfect capital markets are more likely to result in under-
financing, and firms may have to rely mostly on own resources to fund R&D projects.
Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that the cost of external funds to finance
R&D is higher than the cost for alternative investments, although differences may vary
across countries (Hall (2002)). Bond et al. (1999) suggest that financial constraints may
affect mostly the decision to engage in R&D, rather than the level of R&D. Cincera
(2003) finds stronger effects of cash flow constraints for young firms.
Overall, evidence supports the inclusion of cash flow as an indicator of possible funding
constraints faced by firms.19 We expect a positive correlation between cash-flow level
and the probability of doing R&D, and hence of applying for a subsidy. However,
financing constraints might make a firm more likely to apply for public funding, leading
to a negative correlation. Hence, the final correlation between cash-flow and application
for public funding is undetermined. We expect to observe industry variation as well: in
industries where the potential for profitable R&D projects is higher, venture capital may
provide external funding. As an indicator of the ease of access to capital markets we
will include a binary variable for publicly traded firms.
Domestic ownership.
The last factor we will take into account in explaining a firm’s R&D decisions is foreign
ownership. Affiliates of foreign owned companies may benefit from R&D developed in
the home country of the mother company, and may have no incentive to carry out
                                                          
19 A study by Suárez (2000) on the choice of funding sources by Spanish firms, finds that firms that have
high cash-flow tend to be less likely to use funds from financial intermediaries. Firm size and age are
positively related to using funds from external sources.
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additional R&D in the host country nor to apply for public funding.20 We expect on
average a negative relationship between foreign ownership and R&D or R&D subsidy
application in the case of Spain.
To summarize, two types of firms are likely to apply for an R&D subsidy: those that
would do R&D anyway because it is privately profitable, and those that would not
without a sufficiently large expected subsidy. We expect a positive relationship between
the level of human capital, firm size, or cash flow and the likelihood of doing R&D, and
hence a positive relationship among these variables and the likelihood of applying for
public support. The impact of firm size or cash flow on participation will be weak only
to the extent that the second type of firms apply and obtain public funding. The intensity
of these relationships would vary across industries. In industries where fixed R&D set
up costs are low, we would expect a higher proportion of small firms both doing R&D
and applying for subsidies, predicting a low correlation between size and participation
status. In industries with large fixed costs, and to the extent that subsidy programs often
set a cap on the total amount of public funding provided, we would instead expect a
positive correlation between firm size and participation.
4.2. Funding Agencies' choices: some hypotheses.
Public agencies might have a variety of objectives when designing R&D subsidy
programs. These objectives will determine the total budget allocated to these programs,
                                                          
20See Veugelers (1997), Veugelers and Cassiman (2000) and, for empirical evidence on Spanish firms,
González (1999). We do not think that in most cases the main reason for a foreign firm to locate in Spain
is conducting R&D, at least during the sample period.
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its distribution across industries, the ranking criteria or screening rule to be used for
choosing projects and firms, and the amount of subsidy awarded to each individual firm.
The main economic rationale for R&D subsidies is the negative incentive effect caused
by lack of appropriability generated by knowledge spillovers or by failures in capital
markets. In practice public agencies may have additional goals. They might wish,
through R&D subsidies, to attract firms into a particular location (country or region), or
to encourage technological upgrading of firms of particular importance (in terms of
employment, for instance) for the country or region. An agency’s supply of funds and
choice of R&D projects and firms will reflect these goals. Furthermore, if all agencies at
different administration levels within a country share the same goals, they will give a
very similar weight to given firm characteristics, and R&D subsidies would reach the
same type of firms. Provided that application costs were similar across agencies,
estimation of firm participation equations for any type of agency would produce similar
results. In what follows we discuss the expected association between each of potential
agency objectives and some firm characteristics.
If the main purpose of an agency is to fund R&D projects that would not be otherwise
carried out because of market failures, we would expect it to rank applications
according to some measure of the spillover gap. It is hard to have such a measure, but if
evidence indicates that market failures affect more severely small or young firms, and
the agency knows and uses this evidence, we should then observe firm size, cash flow
and firm age to be negatively related to the probability of obtaining a subsidy for R&D.
We will call this the market failure hypothesis.
17
Differences across agencies might arise when knowledge spillovers have limited
geographical scope. Then agencies might coordinate their policies and specialize
according to the geographical scope of those spillovers, each targeting a different type
of projects or of firms. For example, if only large firms, and not small firms, had the
capability to carry out R&D projects generating international spillovers, then it would
make sense to expect a positive association between firm size and probability of
obtaining supranational R&D subsidies. At the same time we would expect a negative
association between firm size and the probability of obtaining regional R&D funds.
A second potential goal of public agencies might be to foster national champions,
funding those R&D projects that are more likely to have commercial success,
independently of the gap between social and private benefits. Larger, experienced firms
are likely to enjoy an advantage in that case, as well as domestic firms. We will call this
the success hypothesis, and expect a positive correlation between firm size, cash flow or
domestic ownership and the probability of obtaining public support.
A third possible goal of the agencies might be to encourage technological upgrading of
firms in declining or traditional industries in order to increase the chances of firm
survival. In that case we would expect firm size again to be positively associated with
the probability of participation, because policy makers are likely to be more concerned
about potentially large employment losses. R&D experience, the number of highly
qualified employees or domestic ownership would not be expected to have a significant
weight, while cash flow might have a negative effect on the probability of granting. We
will call this the survival hypothesis.
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Table 3 below summarizes these conjectures about the patterns of correlation between
some firm characteristics and the probability of being offered a subsidy under different
policy goals.21 It is difficult to sign a priori the association between policy goal and
some of the firm characteristics, and we indicate this through a question mark. But the
signs of firm size and cash flow could be quite informative about which is the dominant
goal of an agency. We should also consider the possibility that the agencies’ goals, or
combination of goals, vary across industries.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
4.3. Empirical specification.
The probability that a firm participates in an R&D program can be written as the joint
probability of two variables, the outcome of the firm’s decision process –whether to
apply or not- and the outcome of the agency’s decision process –awarding or denying
the subsidy, conditional on the firm having applied.22
Prob(Participating = 1|X) = Prob(Apply = 1 , Grant = 1 ; X)
= Prob(Grant=1|Apply=1, X)Prob(Apply=1|X)   [1]
                                                          
21 As a matter of fact, in Spain one of the main national agencies requests from applicants information
both about firm characteristics and about the R&D project to be developed if subsidized. This includes:
number of employees, share owned by foreign stockholders, past R&D expenditures, exports, debt, cash
flow, possible patentability of research output, and whether the project has a pre-competitive nature. We
presume that all these variables enter the agency’s decision rule.
22 We assume that all firms, including those without previous R&D experience, are aware of R&D
programs in place.
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Ideally we would like to estimate separately the two probabilities involved in
participating. Testing hypotheses concerning a firm’s willingness to apply for R&D
subsidies and public agencies' selection rules requires having data on applicants, both
successful and unsuccessful, and on non-applicants. This would enable identification
and estimation of the effects that explanatory variables have on each side of decision
process. In our sample, however, we only observe whether or not firms had subsidized
funding, but not whether they had unsuccessfully applied. In addition, we do not have
specific variables that would clearly affect one decision but not the other. This implies
that we can not identify a structural model and distinguish between the effects that firm
size or other included explanatory variables have on the application decision from the
effects on the granting decision. Instead, we just estimate the net effect, that is, reduced
form parameters. In our empirical analysis we proceed in two steps, the first being of a
descriptive nature, and the second involving the estimation of a set of participation
models.
Step 1: A descriptive Multinomial Logit model. Ignoring the decision processes of firms
and agencies, we can simply classify each firm into one of three mutually exclusive
categories: not doing R&D, doing R&D but not participating in a given agency’s R&D
program, and doing R&D and participating. Firms in the first category do not find R&D
profitable in any case; those in the second category find R&D to be profitable even
without a subsidy, and firms in the third category have R&D projects determined to be
socially profitable by the public agency. We could ask what distinguishes firms that
participate from those that do not but do R&D, and from those that do not do R&D. To
investigate this is we define a categorical variable, STATUS, taking three possible
values: 0 for firms that do not do R&D nor participate, 1 for firms that do R&D but do
20
not participate, and 2 for firms that do R&D and participate. We estimate a multinomial
logit model as a purely descriptive device, and compute the marginal effects that each
explanatory variable has on the probability of a firm falling into a particular category.
This procedure may allow us to distinguish between the roles that for instance firm size
has as an obstacle to doing R&D from its role as an obstacle to participation. We will
later test whether these associations are similar across industries and sources of public
funds.
Step 2: An explanatory model for participation status and R&D effort. Alternatively,
R&D status and participation status can be modeled as the outcomes of two related
processes. For a given firm, a possible specification is:
Pjt *    = αj RDt-1 + βj Xt + ejt [2]
RDt * = Σj γj Pjt + δ Zt + ut [3]
where Pjt* is an unobserved index of a firm’s participation propensity in agency j’s R&D
program, and parameters αj and βj may differ across agencies. Error terms ejt may be
correlated. RDt *can be either the observed R&D expenditure or the binary indicator for
doing R&D, and γj captures the effect of participation in different programs on R&D
effort. As discussed above, we focus on [2], distinguishing between two types of
agencies (national and regional) and six types of manufacturing industries.23 Vector X
contains the exogenous explanatory variables discussed above and defined in table 4.
Year dummies are also included to control for possible variation in the agency’s budget
                                                          
23We do not consider the third type of funding source, “Other”, because of its heterogeneity.
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allocated to each industry during that time period, as well as in macroeconomic
environment.24
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Using data on the amount of public funding received by each firm from each agency
would allow us to obtain more information on the agencies’ preferences. Although the
survey contained information in that respect, we decided not to use it for several
reasons. First, almost half of the firms that report having received public funding do not
report the amount received. Second, while the qualitative decision to grant some
funding might reasonably be related to characteristics of firms, the size of the subsidy
might instead be mostly related to characteristics of the project, which we do not
observe. Finally, when we specify a subsidy size equation for participants, controlling
for selection, we do not find clear economic arguments to impose exclusion restrictions
to identify the model, given the variables we can use.
5. Estimation results.
The sample is divided in several groups of industries according to the degree of
technological intensity.25 We discuss first in some detail the results obtained for the
                                                          
24 We have to make two further remarks about the data. First, cash flow is missing for some observations.
We construct an independent variable, cash flow times a dummy for missing status and include it in the
estimated model instead of the original, jointly with the missing indicator (Miss Cash). This allows for
unbiased estimation of the coefficients of interest and keeps sample size at a reasonable level. Second, all
variables are annual, except for the human capital indicator, which is available every 4 years.
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Chemical and Drug Industry, and then summarize and compare results with those of
remaining industries.
5.1. Results for the Chemical Industry.
Step 1. Table 5 presents the results obtained from the estimation of two multinomial
logit models with three outcomes each. In the first the alternatives are “not doing R&D”
(Status=0), “doing R&D but not participating in national R&D programs” (Status=1)
and “doing R&D and participating in national R&D programs” (Status=2). In the
second model, the alternatives are “not doing R&D”, “doing R&D but not participating
in regional R&D programs” and “doing R&D and participating in regional R&D
programs".26 To simplify table presentation, only estimates corresponding to the third
alternative are shown for the second model. Coefficients shown are the marginal effect
that a change in each explanatory variable has on the probability that a firm falls in each
of the three possible states.
The first column shows that the probability of not doing R&D decreases with firm size
and human capital intensity. Firm size has the highest effect, followed by being fully
domestic. The second column shows that the probability that a firm will do R&D even
                                                                                                                                                                         
25We follow a modified version of the standard OECD classification in four groups of technology
intensity, defined as R&D expenditures divided by value added or by production (see OECD (2001)).
Greater disaggregation is not possible because the number of observations would be too small in terms of
participation in regional level programs.
26 Alternatively, we could have classified firms in five mutually exclusive categories: no R&D, do R&D
without participation, do R&D and participate in national programs only, do R&D and participate in
regional programs only, and do R&D and participate in both. The number of observations would be too
small, however, in some of these categories.
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without national level funding is positively related to firm size and to cash flow.27 The
third column shows that several variables affect the probability that a firm will both do
R&D and receive funding from the national level programs. Comparison of marginal
effects in column 2 to those in column 3 suggests the possible influence of the agency’s
preferences. First, the most important effect is being a pharmaceutical firm, which
increases the probability of participating by 0.17 points. Second, the effect of size,
although positive and significant, is smaller than the effect size had on the probability of
doing R&D. This suggests that the agency indeed may be choosing medium or small
firms among those applying, therefore moderating the importance of size as a barrier,
although its influence remains positive. It also seems to favor domestic firms and those
with higher intensity of human capital, while cash flow is not significant. The age of the
firm is not found to have any effect on the likelihood of being in any category in that
industry.28
We then estimate the multinomial logit model for the case where firms participate in
regional level R&D programs. For “No R&D” status, results are almost identical to
those obtained in the previous model, as expected. Differences arise in the “Doing R&D
and participating” status, as shown in the last column on Table 5. Firm size, human
capital and being domestic are again significant, but the magnitude of the effect is
                                                          
27 When we run a probit model on a sub-sample of R&D doers and non-doers, excluding participants, we
obtain practically the same results: firm size, human capital intensity and cash flow are, in that order, the
variables affecting the probability of doing R&D.
28We find that including previous experience in R&D in the model, increases the probability of doing
R&D increases by 0.55 points, and the probability of doing R&D and participating by 0.05 points. This
variable cannot be used to estimate the regional multinomial logit because it is a perfect predictor,
however, so for comparability it is excluded from the first multinomial model as well.
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smaller. In addition, firms with lower cash flow are somewhat more likely to
participate. Finally, pharmaceutical firms are not more likely to participate in these
programs. We will discuss further testing of differences between the two types of
agency below. Overall, these descriptive results suggest that firm size is an important
obstacle to R&D in this industry, and that national and regional agencies programs
mitigate this effect. They also suggest that these programs reach somewhat different
types of firms, the national agency showing a preference for pharmaceutical firms, and
regional agencies for firms with lower cash flow.29
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Step 2. There were only seven cases of firms not doing R&D in year t and obtaining a
subsidy from the national programs the following year. All participants in regional
programs were doing R&D the previous year. Though previous experience in R&D is
not explicitly required to participate, the data suggest that those firms that were doing
R&D are possibly more likely to apply for funding, or make better R&D proposals and
obtain a higher acceptance rate, or both. For estimation purposes, this means that R&D
experience becomes a perfect predictor, making the estimated coefficient close to
infinity, so the model cannot be estimated. Consequently, we estimate three alternative
participation models for national and regional programs, shown in Table 6. First, a
simple probit using the whole sample (column 1); second, a probit restricting the sample
to those firms that were doing R&D the previous year (column 2), and third, since that
                                                          
29 The Small-Hsiao test of independence of irrelevant alternatives suggests that the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected. When we estimate a simple logit model with two alternatives, participating or not, excluding
from the sample those firms that fall in category “no R&D”, results are in fact very similar, confirming
the independence hypothesis.
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may introduce selection bias, we estimate a probit model for participation controlling
for selection on having previous R&D experience (columns 3 and 4). The same
procedure is performed for participation in regional programs, and results are shown on
columns 5 to 8.
Overall the results are in line with those obtained with the multinomial logit model, and
most are robust to specification changes.30 They confirm that the probability of doing
R&D in this industry is related to firm size and human capital. Conditioning on previous
R&D experience, national and regional R&D programs seem to reach different types of
firms. National programs reach mostly pharmaceutical, domestic firms, with high
intensity in human capital. We do not find evidence that the age of the firm or financial
variables affect the likelihood of participating in national programs, indicating that
those programs did not succeed, on average, in reaching young firms or those facing
funding constraints. In contrast, regional government programs do not favor
pharmaceutical firms. The association with firm size and other remaining observed
characteristics is smaller, and cash flow has a negative effect.
Although firm size contributes positively to the likelihood of participating in any of the
two types of programs, its influence is much smaller than on the probability of doing
R&D, indicating that both agencies receive applications from smaller firms and that
they are successful at obtaining some funding. This suggests that both programs reduce
the weight of firm size as a barrier to R&D, but since the effect of size is still positive
                                                          
30 Coefficients and significance do not change much if a univariate probit or logit model for participation
for the sub-sample that does R&D is estimated, without controlling for selection. The only coefficient that
seems unstable corresponds to Cash Flow when estimating the probability of doing R&D, depending on
whether firm age is included or dropped from the regression.
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and not negative, we may conclude that agencies are not reaching a large proportion of
small firms. This might be either because smaller firms do not apply or because, if they
do, their projects are more likely to be rejected. In terms of the association patterns
between firm characteristics and possible agency goals, these results suggest that
participation in national programs would be compatible, ex post, with a policy of
subsidizing success, whether or not this is the intended goal. Participation patterns in
regional programs could be attributed to a combination of goals.31
[Insert Table 6 about here]
5.2. Heterogeneity across agencies and industries.
We summarize first the results obtained from estimating the descriptive multinomial
logit model for different industries. Table 7 reports the significant marginal effects of
the main variables obtained from the multinomial logit estimation for each group of
industries. We observe that the independent variables have a different effect on status
depending on the industry. Not doing R&D (category 0) is mostly related to firm size in
all industries, but it appears to be a more important obstacle in medium or high tech
industries. Domestic firms are more likely to fall into the category of R&D doers in
most except the food, tobacco and textile industries. Differences in human capital
intensity also matter, but relatively more in some traditional industries. Financial
variables (cash flow or being publicly traded) are not found to be significant in most
cases. The age of the firm is not found to have much effect, except in some advanced
                                                          
31 Some firms in the sample had access to funds from both sources. Using sub-samples of firms that had
funds from only one source could possibly lead to more clear cut results in terms of differences across
agencies, but this would reduce further the number of observations, especially for regional programs.
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technology industries, where younger firms are more likely to do R&D, while the
opposite is found in more mature industries. As for participation in national R&D
programs, we observe that being a domestic firm increases the probability in
technologically intensive industries. Participation in regional level programs seems to
be somewhat related to financial variables.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
These results suggest that R&D programs reach different types of firms in each
industry, possibly reflecting differences in agency goals. As discussed above, we are
unable to test directly for intended agency allocation rules with our data, but still we can
reasonably test the following null hypothesis: the likelihood that a firm in a given
industry will be a participant in each agency's subsidy program is driven by the same
factors in a similar way. To do this we estimate a bivariate probit model where the
dependent variables are participation status in the two agencies, and test for equality of
coefficients of both equations (H0: b1 = b2). We define two unobserved index variables,
YNG and YRG, measuring participation potential in each possible agency (national or
regional), and the respective observed participation status, DCG, and DGR:
Y CG =   b1‘ X + e1    ; with DCG  = 1 if Y CG    > 0
Y RG =   b2‘ X + e2      ; with DRG  = 1 if Y RG    > 0
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Disturbances are likely to be correlated because of the presence of unobserved firm
characteristics that affect participation status in both sources, such as R&D project
characteristics. As before, we use the sub-sample of firms that did R&D the previous
period. Tables 8 and 9 summarize the results. Table 8 shows the marginal effect of a
change in an independent variable on the probability of participating in each agency’s
program, conditional on the firm doing R&D the year previous to participating. It seems
that, in general, larger and domestic firms have a higher probability of participating in
national level programs in high or medium-high technological intensity industries, but
not in low technological intensity industries. Lagged cash flow and being publicly
traded are not found significant for participation in national programs. In the case of
regional level programs, firm size and being domestic have a smaller effect on the
probability of participation, and financial variables are sometimes significant. Results
are similar to those obtained in the multinomial logit estimation. In terms of goodness of
fit measures, estimates of national level participation equations are generally better than
regional level participation equations.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Table 9 gives the results of test statistics for the hypothesis of equality of coefficients in
both equations. Column (1) provides the chi-square statistic for the null hypothesis of
equality of all coefficients; column (2) gives the outcome of testing equality of
individual coefficients. For all but one group of industries we reject the hypothesis that
national and regional R&D subsidies reach, on average, firms with the same observed
characteristics within a given industry, conditional on previous R&D experience.
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[Insert Table 9 about here]
How to interpret overall these results in terms of the possible correspondence between
firm characteristics and the hypothetical goals of the agencies? As the data show, both
national and regional programs in the period 1990-1996 reached mostly firms that had
previous experience in R&D. These firms might have been more likely to apply, or, if
inexperienced firms also did, their projects might have been more likely to be rejected.
Firm size is never found to have a negative effect on participation, suggesting that it is
very difficult to attract an important share of small firms into R&D activities, especially
in industries of high technological intensity. Nevertheless, the effect that firm size has
on participation is smaller than the effect it has on the decision to do R&D, suggesting
that both public agencies give size a different weight than the market. To the extent that
size is associated with market failures, it would seem that both agencies do take them
into account to some extent. However, since firm age is not found to have a negative
effect on participation, nor cash flow for national level programs, these results suggest
that these programs, during the sample period, were not appropriate to address the type
of market failures that affect young and start-up firms.
The higher importance of size and human capital in explaining participation in national
level R&D programs suggests that the agency might be selecting those firms with better
projects, in the sense of their chances of having commercial success, in industries of
high or medium-high technological intensity. The agency could be playing in part the
role of certifying the quality of, and providing funds to, R&D projects that perhaps
could have been financed by private investors had they had the ability to evaluate
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them.32 The public agency may be acting as if addressing an information failure in the
private sector, which is different from the standard failures associated with R&D. On
the other hand, the agency could be funding R&D projects which involve higher risk
than private investors are willing to take. To test this though we would need data on the
nature of the projects, and on the evolution and sources of private funding for R&D
after participating.
Regional level programs instead seem to reach on average smaller firms. Financial
variables also have some effect in some cases, suggesting that the observed outcomes at
the regional level may be compatible with both the market failure and the survival
hypotheses.
Finally we have tested for industry heterogeneity in participation in national level
programs.33 We estimate a separate participation probit model for some industry groups,
and then a series of pooled models. Results show that for each of the high and medium-
high tech industries equality of coefficients is rejected, but not for those classified as
medium-low or low tech. The main difference across industries is that national agency
funds reach mostly domestic firms in industries such as pharmaceuticals, computers,
communications equipment. This is not so in the remaining industries.
6. Summary of findings and concluding remarks.
                                                          
32 Lerner (1999) suggests this possible certifying effect of public agencies in his evaluation of the SBIR
program in the US.
33 We do not report the estimates here, and just summarize the results.
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Subsidized R&D loans and grants to firms together with tax incentives for R&D
activities are currently widely used as tools to encourage private innovation effort in
many OECD countries. Asking to what extent these tools of technology policy are
working effectively, and what factors might limit their effectiveness, become important
policy issues. One possible reason for limited effectiveness of direct subsidies or grants
might be found at the level of the determination of participation status: programs might
fail to reach the targeted population, or the agency selection rule might not be accurate
enough. This issue has not been previously investigated, as far as we know.
We have focused on the participation stage and investigated whether there are
systematic differences in the likelihood of participation of firms in national and regional
level R&D programs in Spain, and how some firm characteristics affect participation.
Our main results are the following:
1. Holding the industry constant, we reject the hypothesis that participation in regional
and national R&D programs is driven by the same variables in all but one group of
low technological intensity industries.
2. There are some common patterns of incidence of some firm characteristics on
program participation. Previous experience in R&D is always positively associated
with participation. Subsidy policies seem to have been more effective in attracting
firms that already do R&D (especially in the high tech industries) during the period
examined, than in inducing non-R&D doers to change their behavior. Firm size is
found to have either positive or no statistically significant effects, but never
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negative. This suggests that firm size is an important barrier, and that agencies only
partially succeed in attracting relatively smaller firms. Success in attracting young
firms seems limited as well. Other complementary policies, such as providing
venture or seed capital, might be more effective in some cases.
3. Most differences across agencies and industries concern the magnitude of the size
effect, incidence of human capital intensity, cash flow and domestic ownership,
suggesting that the observed allocation would be consistent with different
combinations of goals in each agency. The participation patterns observed for
national level programs seem to be consistent with the success hypothesis in
industries of high or medium high technological intensity. The participation pattern
observed for regional level programs would be consistent with the market failure or
survival enhancing hypotheses.
4. Holding funding source constant, we reject the null hypothesis of industry
homogeneity in participation in national level R&D programs in the case of high
and medium high technology industries.
We interpret our results as providing evidence that national and regional programs end
up supporting different types of firms, and that each agency may be using R&D
subsidies with somewhat different policy goals in each industry. Accordingly, R&D
subsidies can be expected to have different effects on private R&D effort or on
productivity in different industries and for different agencies.
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An important limitation our research faces is that we do not know which firms applied
for but did not obtain public funding, or what were the characteristics of the firms’
R&D proposals. Consequently, we have not been able to unambiguously identify the
agencies’ screening rule from the effects of other factors hindering firm participation.
Better data are needed in order to improve our understanding of firms’ decisions to
apply for public funding, of agency allocation rules and their compatibility with
potential goals, and of the effects of R&D subsidies. First, we need to know which firms
applied for but did not receive R&D funding in order to be able to separate agency
decision rules from application obstacles. Second, it would be desirable to have
information about the nature of R&D projects, not only on firm characteristics.
Although these might be correlated, this correlation need not always be strong, and after
all agencies evaluate projects. Third, better measures of the firms’ human capital are
needed, especially at the management level. We think that progress in evaluation
research relies to a good extent on improvements in data quality, and hope that public
institutions involved in survey design will take into account these needs in the near
future.
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Table 1. R&D activities and R&D subsidies
Spanish Manufacturing Firms, 1990-1996
Firms doing R&D Firms receiving
R&D subsidies
Year Number
of Firms
in the
sample
Number Percent Number Percent
Private
R&D/Sales
%
(only R&D
doers)
Average
Subsidy
ratio of
firms
receiving
subsidy
1990 2154 714 33.1 183 25.6 2.28 13.6
1991 2051 745 36.3 176 23.6 2.23 14.6
1992 1968 683 34.7 175 25.6 2.13 14.8
1993 1864 628 33.7 152 24.2 2.06 15.5
1994 1872 654 34.9 171 25.1 2.05 21.8
1995 1701 590 34.7 154 26.1 2.03 23.3
1996 1712 593 34.6 161 27.1 2.01 16.4
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Table 2. Number of firms receiving R&D subsidies by funding source.
Source 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Central Admin. only 72 76 71 69 64 68 57
Regional Admin. only 52 37 37 24 41 34 26
Other only 22 16 17 17 17 14 30
Central & Regional 19 28 18 14 19 15 21
Central & Other 11 10 16 13 14 9 12
Regional & Other 2 2 5 4 5 3 4
Central, Regional &
Other
5 7 11 11 11 11 11
Total 183 176 175 152 171 154 161
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Table 3. Firm characteristics and agency objectives.
Variables Expected signs according to policy goal
Market failure Success Survival
Experience in R&D ? + ?
Firm age - ? +
Cash-Flow - + -
Human capital + + ?
Firm Size - + +
Domestic ownership ? + ?
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Table 4. Variable definition.
Variables Description
Dependent variables
STATUS
Participation in Central Admin. Programs
Participation in Regional Adm. Programs
Categorical variable with 3 values:
0 if firm does no R&D; 1 if it does R&D but does
not participate; 2 if it does R&D and participates
=1 if firm participates; 0 otherwise
=1 if firm participates, 0 otherwise
Explanatory variables
EXPERIENCE
AGE
HUMAN CAPITAL
SIZE
CASH FLOW
DOMESTIC
TRADED
Binary; =1 if firm was doing R&D, previous year
Age of the firm in years
Number (or percentage) of university graduates and
engineers in the firm
Firm size measured by the number of employees
Firm’s cash flow; lagged one period.
Binary: =1 if fully domestic
Binary: =1 if publicly traded
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Table 5. R&D and Participation Status. Chemical Industry.
Multinomial Logit Estimation.
Marginal effects on the probability of being in each category
National Programs
0= No R&D; 1= R&D, no participation;
2= R&D and participation
Regional Programs
STATUS=0 STATUS=1 STATUS=2 STATUS=2
(Log)AGE .025
(0.53)
-.009
(0.21)
-.016
(1.52)
.002
(.26)
HUMAN
CAPITAL
-.012**
(1.95)
.007
(1.27)
.005***
(2.94)
.001**
(1.95)
FIRM SIZE -.208***
(6.16)
.143***
(4.55)
.064***
(4.94)
.016***
(3.11)
DOMESTIC -.145*
(1.64)
.071
(.84)
.074***
(2.85)
.048**
(2.39)
.
CASH FLOW -.024
(1.55)
.026*
(1.69)
-.001
(.20)
-.013**
(1.89)
DMSCASH .028
(0.48)
-.026
(0.47)
-.002
(.11)
-.005
(.49)
DNOPHARMA .071
(.92)
.09
(1.28)
-.169***
(3.74)
.004
(.25)
Observations in
each category
Number of firms
263
68
394
109
129
47
34
16
Log Likelihood
Total number of
Observations
Number of firms
Pseudo R2
-561.93
786
159
0.30
-460.07
786
159
0.27
Notes common to all tables henceforth:
1. Observations are firm-years. For most firms we have several observations, and these will not be
independent. This is taken into account in estimation, and the robust Huber/White estimator of variance is
used.
2. Robust z statistic shown in parentheses in absolute value. Significant marginal effects, in bold, are
shown: *** indicates significance at the 1 % level; ** at the 5 %, and * at the 10 %.
43
Table 6. Participation in national and regional R&D programs. Chemical Industry.
Participation in National Programs Participation in Regional Programs Probability Doing R&D
Probit
Whole
sample
Marginal Ef
(1)
Probit
Subsample
DRDt-1=1
Marginal Ef.
(2)
Probit with
selection.
Estimated
Coefficients
(3)
Marginal
Effects on
Prob(DFN|
DRD=1)
(4)
Probit
Whole
Sample
Marginal Ef.
(5)
Probit
Subsample
Marginal Ef.
(6)
Probit with
selection
(7)
Marginal
Effects on
Prob(DFR|D
RD=1)
(8)
From Probit
with
selection
(9)
Marginal
Effects on
Prob(DRD)
(10)
HUMAN
CAPITAL
0.01
(3.34)
0.01
(3.81)
0.042
(2.80)
0.01 0.002
(2.15)
0.001
(0.06)
0.002 0.040
(2.71)
0.01
FIRM SIZE 0.07
(5.56)
0.10
(4.47)
0.376
(2.29)
0.09 0.01
(3.75)
-0.092
(0.15)
0.02 0.564
(6.79)
0.19
DOMESTIC 0.08
(2.37)
0.12
(2.33)
0.520
(1.98)
0.09 0.04
(2.92)
0.06
(2.5)
0.493
(1.43)
0.05 0.365
(1.45)
CASH FLOW -0.001
(0.08)
-0.01
(2.37)
-0.01
(2.63)
-0.01
(2.36)
-0.01
DMSCASHL -0.039
(0.23)
-0.101
(0.17)
DTRADED 0.008
(0.02)
0.499
(1.07)
DNOPHARMA -0.19
(4.60)
-0.30
(4.97)
-1.045
(4.04)
-0.21 0.128
(0.25)
Constant -2.622
(2.14)
-0.784
(6.09)
-2.847
(5.92)
Year dummies included included included included included included included included
Log Likelihood
Wald rho=0
Pseudo R2
-247.37
0.30
-150.11
0.32
-561.46
Do not reject
-114.41
0.18
-87.26
0.16
-460.86
Reject
Observations 775 426 781 775 426 781 781
Notes:
1. In this table marginal effects are reported in bold. For selection models, both estimated coefficients and marginal effects are reported.
2. DRD=1 if a firm does R&D at t; DRD t-1=1 if a firm does R&D at t-1; DFN=1 if firm obtains national funds; DFR=1 if it obtains regional funds.
3. Goodness of fit of DFN (DFR): The model correctly predicts 78 %  (74 %) of non participants, and 77 %  (74 %) of participants, conditional on DRD=1.
The model correctly predicts 65 % of observations with DRD=0, and 87% of observations with DRD=1.
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Table 7. Multinomial Logit Status Estimates. By industry type.
Significant marginal effects only
STATUS Chem &
Drugs
New
Tech
High-
Med
Tech
Med-
Low
Tech
Low
FWT
Low
NMM
No R&D .01 -.01 -.01
R&D -.02 .01
National
Age
Regional
No R&D -.01 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.04 -.02
R&D .02 .01 .04 .02
National .005 .01 .002
Human
Capital
Regional .001 .002
No R&D -.21 -.06 -.18 -.20 -.09 -.15
R&D .15 -.08 .14 .18 .09 .13
National .07 .14 .05 .02 .01 .01
Firm Size
Regional .02 .03 .01 .004 .02
No R&D -.15 -.11 -.20 .08
R&D .13 -.08
National .08 .16 .08 .01 .01
Domestic
Regional .05 .06 .01
No R&D
R&D .02
National -.001
Cash Flow
Regional -.013 -.001 -.001
No R&D -.23
R&D
National
Publicly
traded
Regional -.04
Notes:
1. STATUS has three possible values: 0 if a firm does not do R&D nor participate. 1 if it does R&D but
does not participate; 2 if it participates. Two sets of multinomial logit models are estimated, one for
participation in national level programs, and one for participation in regional level programs. Row
“National” shows results for doing R&D and participating in national level programs. Row
“Regional” shows results for doing R&D and participating in regional level programs. Results for the
other two categories in the estimated multinomial logit are not reported for brevity.
2. Industry groups are as follows: Chemical and Drugs; New Tech (Office equipment and electronics);
High-Med (Office equipment, electrical products and car industry); Med-Low (Metals, Machinery,
Other transportation, Rubber and Plastics); Low FWT (Food, Meat, Wood, Textiles, Leather, Paper),
and Low NMM (Non metallic minerals and Metal products).
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Table 8. Participation in national and regional level programs.
Marginal effects on the probability of participating in R&D programs
Bivariate probit estimates
Chemical Medium-High Medium-Low Low FWT Low NMM
National Region National Region National Region National Region National Region
Age 0.04
Human
Capital
0.01 .007 0.01 0.006
Size 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04
Domestic 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.09
Cash Flow -0.09 0.01 0.01
Traded -0.08 0.20 -0.02
Note:  Estimated correlations of disturbances in both equations are always positive and significant in all
types of industries, ranging from 0.48 to 0.73.
Table 9. Testing Hypothesis of equality across agencies.
Sample: only firms that did R&D the previous period.
(based on bivariate probit estimation)
Industry
(1)
Chi-2 test of
equality of all
coefficents (df)
(2)
Outcome of tests for individual
coefficients
Chemical & Drugs 70.03 (13):
Reject
Reject equality of human capital,
firm size, cash flow and pharma
dummy
Medium-high 42.84 (12):
Reject
Reject equality of human capital,
size, traded.
Medium-low 38.95 (15):
Reject
Reject equality of size, traded.
Low FWT 47.31 (14):
Reject
Reject equality of human capital,
size, cash flow and traded.
Low NMM 13.80 (12):
Do not reject
Do not reject equality of all
coefficients.
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